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Financial crises in emerging market countries appear to be very costly: both output and a host of partial
welfare indicators decline dramatically. The magnitude of these costs is puzzling both from an accounting
perspective -- factor usage does not decline as much as output, resulting in large falls in measured
productivity -- and from a theoretical perspective. Towards a resolution of this puzzle, we present
a framework that allows us to (i) account for changes in a country's measured productivity during a
financial crises as the result of changes in the underlying technology of the economy, the efficiency
with which resources are allocated across sectors, and the efficiency of the resource allocation within
sectors driven both by reallocation amongst existing plants and by entry and exit; and (ii) measure
the change in the country's welfare resulting from changes in productivity, government spending, the
terms of trade, and a country's international investment position. We apply this framework to the Argentine
crisis of 2001 using a unique establishment level data-set and find that more than half of the roughly
10% decline in measured total factor productivity can be accounted for by deterioration in the allocation
of resources both across and within sectors. We measure the decline in welfare to be on the order of
one-quarter of one years GDP.
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Financial crises in emerging market economies are costly: declines in economic activity are
large, while a host of social indicators suggest that welfare falls substantially, too. For example,
in the months surrounding the sovereign default and devaluation in Argentina at the end of 2001,
output fell by 15%, down 20% from its previous peak, while unemployment exceeded 20% and almost
half of the population fell below the poverty line. Large declines were observed also in the Asian
Crisis economies in 1997 and 1998.1
Declines of this magnitude are hard to explain. From an accounting perspective, usage of
factor inputs declines by less than output, resulting in a large decline in measured productivity.
From a theoretical perspective, we have no theory as to why technology should regress during a
crisis, and while measured productivity might decline due to declines in factor utilization, changes
in utilization do not appear large enough to explain observed declines. Moreover, improvements in
the terms of trade and write-os of foreign debt increase a country's wealth partially osetting the
eect of the decline in productivity on welfare.
How much does welfare decline as a result of a nancial crises? How much of this decline
is the result of the decline in productivity? And what factors account for the decline in observed
productivity? In this paper, we present a framework that allows us to account for observed changes
in a country's productivity during a nancial crises, and to measure the resulting change in the
country's welfare. Specically, we show how to decompose the change in an economy's measured
productivity into changes in the eciency with which resources are allocated across sectors, changes
in the eciency of the resource allocation within sectors driven both by reallocation amongst existing
plants, as well as reallocation driven by both entry and exit, and changes in the underlying technology
of the economy. We then show how to combine this measure with data on government spending,
movements in the terms of trade, and in a country's international investment position, to measure
the aggregate change in welfare of the economy.
We then apply this framework to the 2001 Argentine nancial crisis using a unique dataset
on the behavior of establishments throughout the crisis, combined with national accounting data.
We nd that the productivity of the Argentine economy fell by 11.5 per-cent between 1997 and
2001, when the crisis was at its peak, before recovering substantially in 2002. Of this decline,
1Poverty rates more than doubled in Indonesia (Suryahadi et al 2000); domestic violence increased 20% in Malaysia
(Shari 2001); child mortality rates increased 30% in Indonesia (Bhutta et al 2008); murders increased by 27.5% in
Thailand (Knowles et al 1999); suicide rates increased 20% in Korea (Lee 2004).we can account for more than half, as the result of a deterioration in the eciency with which
resources are allocated both across and within industries. Of this, the largest contributions come
from deteriorations in the allocation of resources, and particularly labor, within industries.
We then measure the change in welfare induced by the crisis and nd that the decline in
welfare is equivalent to a one-quarter reduction in GDP in the year 1998. This is because the decline
in welfare resulting from the reduction in measured productivity (from both increased misallocation
and other sources) is oset by a combination of the change in the countries net foreign asset position,
improvements in the prices at which it trades with the rest of the world, and tighter constraints on
the governments ability to waste resources.
Our paper builds on several literatures. Like Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005), Meza
and Quintin (2005), Benjamin and Meza (2007), Kehoe and Ruhl (2006), Christiano, Gust and Rol-
dos (2004), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Mendoza (2006), Mendoza and Yue (2007), Arellano and
Mendoza (2003) and Mendoza and Smith (2006), our paper aims to understand the consequences
of international nancial crises for output and productivity. Unlike all of these papers, our paper
presents a framework for interpreting measured changes in economic activity as changes in wel-
fare, and focuses on the role of distortions at a microeconomic level during the crisis in producing
aggregate outcomes. Our paper is complementary to Gopinath and Neiman (2011) who nd that
variations in the availability of imported intermediate inputs during the Argentine crisis can explain
a signicant portion of the decline in aggregate productivity. Like Domar (1961), Weitzman (1976),
and Basu and Fernald (2002) we study the relationship between measured productivity and welfare;
unlike these papers, we consider an open economy with a government sector, and with arbitrary
un-priced distortions to factor and goods markets. 2 Our emphasis on an open economy is shared
by Hamada and Iwata (1984) and Kehoe and Ruhl (2007); unlike the latter, we study an economy
with unbalanced trade, with a government, and with arbitrary unpriced distortions in goods and
factor markets, while also analyzing the impact of the dierent measurement techniques for gross
domestic product that are adopted in practice.
Like Solow (1957), Hulten (1978), Baily et al (1992), Basu and Fernald (2002), Petrin and
Levinsohn (2005), and the work surveyed in Foster et al (2001), we study the relationship between
technological progress at a plant level, reallocation of factors across plants, and aggregate tech-
2Since writing the rst draft of this paper, we have become aware of Basu et al (2009) who present a method for
measuring the change in welfare of a stochastic open economy over time. Our paper diers in studying the change in
welfare resulting from a nancial crisis (and hence relative to an assumed path for the economy in the absence of a
crisis), our focus on unpriced distortions to the allocation of factors, and our application to data.
2nology; unlike these papers, we study the role of arbitrary distortions in generating gains from
the reallocation of resources. Finally, our study of the role of distortions in the resource allocation
mechanism in producing aggregate economic outcomes over time is related to Hall's (1988 and 1990)
studies of the eect of imperfect competition on measured productivity, and to studies of the role
of \wedges" at an aggregate level as in Cole and Ohanian (2005) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2006). Finally, in contrast to Restuccia and Rogerson (2003) and Hsieh and Klenow (2007) who
study deviations from the optimal allocation of resources across plants within industries in dierent
countries at a point in time, our paper studies the relative contribution of across industry realloca-
tion, within industry reallocation among existing plants, and within industry reallocation induced
by entry and exit, in producing changes in the actual allocation of resources for one country over
time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our framework for analyzing
the productivity, output and welfare costs of international nancial crises. Section 3 then derives
the relationships between these objects as well as between these objects and empirical measures
of output and productivity. We also show how several popular theoretical models t into our
framework. Section 4 describes our application of this framework to data on Argentina during the
2001/2002 nancial crisis and presents our ndings, while Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we outline our framework for studying the impact of an international nancial
crisis on output, productivity and welfare. Rather than encoding a theory of a nancial crisis, the
model is intended as a measurement and accounting device: a number of exogenous variables, or
\wedges", are introduced that are just identied by the data. The model then provides a framework
for aggregating these wedges to account for observed changes in productivity and for measuring the
(otherwise unobserved) change in welfare.
Consider a world that is deterministic; all agents in the economy have perfect foresight, except
with regard to the advent of the international nancial crisis which is modeled as an unforeseen
event. The economy is small and open, taking world interest rates and the prices of its imports and
exports as given; trade need not be balanced, so that the net foreign asset position of the country
is evolving over time. There is a government that collects tax revenues and expends resources that
may be valuable to households. There are many industries producing dierent goods, with these
goods aggregated to form the national accounts expenditure categories. Production takes place in
3plants that act competitively, each facing plant specic distortions { the \wedges" { that aect their
incentive to produce at all, as well as to hire the various factors of production. These wedges stand
in for a wide range of factors, that might be part of the technology of the economy, or the market
environment, that drive a wedge between the price plants pay for a factor and the price received
by the supplier of the factor; they allow us to capture a range of dierent economic environments
including ones with imperfect competition.
2.A Households
There is a unit measure of identical households who maximize utility dened over streams of




s t [U (Cs;1   Ls) +  (Gs)];
where U is the period utility function that depends on private consumption and leisure, and  
captures the welfare benets (if any) of government expenditure. The assumption that households
are identical implies that we can study the decisions of a representative households at the cost of
not allowing us to consider the welfare eects of changes in the distribution of income.
Period t begins with the households owning Bt bonds and ^ Kt capital. The household rst
decides how many investment goods to purchase, It; which cost PIt per unit, and then the entire
Kt = ^ Kt+It is devoted to production this period. The reason for allowing investment this period to
aect the amount of capital devoted to production this period, is that we wish to allow the capital
stock to respond to a crisis that occurs at the start of a period.
After capital is determined, labor supply decisions are made. Then all factors are paid and
consumption occurs with the consumption good costing PCt per unit. What is left is carried forward
into tomorrow as depreciated capital
^ Kt+1 = (1   )Kt = (1   )





Bt+1 = PLtLt + PKt

^ Kt + It

+ t   Tt + (1 + rBt)Bt   (PCtCt + PItIt):
Here t represents any prots earned by plants which are returned to the household, Tt reects
4lump-sum transfers and taxes from the government, and rBt is the world interest rate, while PLt
and PKt are the rental rates of labor and capital respectively. Government spending and transfers
are treated as exogenous by the household.





of the households problem at time t given inherited values of capital ^ Kt and bonds Bt; then it is

















PCtCt + PItIt + Bt+1  PLtLt + PKt

^ Kt + It

+ (1 + rBt)Bt + t   Tt;
with ^ Kt and Bt given, and with Bt bounded below by some large (and non-binding) debt limit for
all t to rule out Ponzi schemes. As the problem is convex, and under the usual dierentiability
assumptions on U, we can show that the Wt are dierentiable. If we let t denote the households
shadow price of resources, the rst order necessary conditions for an optimum include
uL (Ct;1   Lt) = PLtt;








































= t (1 + rBt): (2)
Note that, as the household faces undistorted market prices, these same market prices capture the
marginal social costs and benets of household decisions. This will be important in our welfare
analysis below.
52.B Government
Government spending makes up a substantial fraction of GDP for most countries. As a result,
our assumptions about how this spending is determined, and about how it is valued, can have a
large impact on our estimates of welfare. In what follows, we examine two more-or-less polar cases.
In both cases, this spending is nanced by a combination of exogenously given distortionary taxes
on plants (to be described below) and lump sum taxes. For simplicity we keep the governments
budget balanced in each period through an appropriate choice of lump-sum taxes and transfers.3
In the rst case, we treat government spending as pure waste so that  (Gt) = 0 for all t; with
its level in each period exogenously given. In the second case, we allow the government to choose
Gt benevolently. In this case, the government's choices satisfy  0 (Gt) = tPGt; where t is the
shadow price of the household introduced above and PGt is the price of one unit of the government
expenditure good.
2.C Production of Basic Commodities
We consider an economy with J basic commodities produced in separate competitive indus-
tries. In each industry j, production takes place in plants of which there are a nite set of types
indexed by i: A plant's type may evolve over time and denotes the level of its productivity, as well
as the size of any distortions imposed on the plant in deciding whether to produce, and how much of
each factor to hire. A plant of type i operating in industry j can sell it's output at the market price
PYj which it takes as given. In order to produce in a given period, the plant must pay a ow xed
cost Fj. We denominate these xed costs in units of capital that we think of as the core buildings
and structures within which production takes place. Once the xed cost has been paid, the plant
combines capital used for production Kij; labor Lij; and intermediate inputs Qij to produce output












Here Aij is the plant type i of industry j specic level of technology. We let Aj denote the ecient
level of technology in industry j (the level that would arise if factors were allocated eciently





3This is without loss of generality because, in this model, for a given sequence of distortionary taxes, private
borrowing will adjust to oset any path of government debt.
6parameter j is assumed to be less than one implying the existence of decreasing returns to scale at
the plant level, which we use to pin down the scale of production at a plant.
Plants hire factors on competitive factor markets, taking factor prices as given. In the spirit
of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan's (2002) business cycle accounting, we posit the existence of plant
specic wedges that distort the hiring decisions of a plant away from what would be chosen if all
plants faced the same input prices. Specically, if we let Px denote the (common) market price of
factor x for x = K;L; or Q; and xi be the plant and factor specic wedge faced by a plant of type





positive value of xij can be thought of as a tax that increases the cost of the factor to the plant.
We let Fij capture any distortions to xed costs which aect the incentive of a plant to produce in
a given period. One could, in principle, also consider a wedge that aects the output price received
by an individual plant. However, it is straightforward to see than an output wedge is equivalent to
a constant wedge aecting all factor inputs and the xed cost in the same way.
We interpret these wedges as a stand-in for all of the costs of hiring factors beyond the market
price of the factor itself. Thus wedges may capture the presence of government taxes, adjustment
costs to varying factors, or the eect of rationing due to quantity restrictions or borrowing con-
straints. Below, we will use data on actual factor employment decisions to identify the sizes and
characteristics of these wedges, and will refer to changes in the size and pattern of these wedges as
the impact of the nancial crisis on the resource allocation mechanism.
A plant of type i in industry j that decides to produce in a period chooses factor inputs to
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7During a nancial crisis, there is often a great deal of turnover in the set of plants in operation.
To capture this feature of the data, we will need to allow for entry and exit in our model. We adopt
a framework in which the decision to produce in a period is static so that, when taking the model
to the data, we do not have to take a stand as to the plants expectations about future production
decisions. Specically, we assume that plants must pay the xed cost PKF to produce in each
period. After paying the xed cost, plants then learn about their type i which is drawn from a
(time and industry varying) distribution given by the probabilities ij: We assume that the wedge
on xed costs, and that part of the wedge on capital that applies to xed costs, are levied in lump
sum fashion so that they do not aect the plants decision to produce ex post. Entry occurs as long














We let Nj denote the total number of plants that produce in industry j in a period. Our assumptions
allow us to work with the data as though there were repeated cross sections of plants.
In this framework, if all plants in an industry faced the same wedges Ki;Li; and Qi, relative
(although not total) supply of output and usage of factors would be the same across plants in that
industry. When we apply our framework to the data, it will be dierences in supply and factor
usage which will allow us to identify dierences in wedges. Noting that as aggregate industry j
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i ij (1   ij)
; (6)
where we have dened 1 ij to be the scale wedge of a plant of type i in industry j given by the above
geometric weighted average of the wedges on technology, capital services, labor and intermediate
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(1   ij)(1   Qij)
Nj
P
i ij (1   ij)(1   Qij)
;
which veries our intuition that a plant's relative demand for a factor depends in part upon its
scale and in part upon the relative wedge it faces for that factor. Note that these expressions
are homogenous of degree zero in the industry wide level of any one or combination of wedges;
although the total amount of a factor hired by the industry may change, relative hiring decisions
are unaected by a common change in wedges in an industry.
Finally, it is convenient to note that, by aggregating the plants rst order conditions we can
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Kj analogously, the residual from output after labor and intermediate goods have been
paid is
PYjYj   PLLj   PQQj
PYjYj
=










where j is the ratio of revenues not paid to labor and intermediate inputs, to the payments made
to capital, in industry j; if all wedges are zero in industry j, j = 1.
2.D Industries, Sectors and Aggregation
There are four nal goods in the economy: an aggregate consumption good C; an investment
good I; a government spending good G; and an export good X: In addition there is an aggregate
intermediate input Q. Each of the nal commodities plus the aggregate intermediate input are
9produced using some combination of the J basic commodities along with the imported good M
using a constant returns to scale technology that is operated by competitive undistorted plants.
The technology for producing the nal consumption good, for example, is represented by
Ct = HC (C1t;C2t;:::;CJt;MCt);
where Cjt represents the amount of output from industry j; and MCt the amount of the import
good, used for nal consumption, and HC is a homogenous of degree one function. Analogous
homogeneous of degree one aggregators Hv exist for v = I;G;X; and Q. The constraints on the
usage of each commodity j are given by
Cjt + Ijt + Gjt + Xjt + Qjt  Yjt;
with use of the import good constrained by
MCt + MIt + MGt + MXt + MQt  Mt:
In what follows, we suppress the industry j subscript except when it would cause confusion.
The assumption of constant returns to scale combined with the assumption that these tech-
nologies are operated by competitive plants ensures that the price of each of these aggregates Pvt
for v = C;I;G;Q is a homogeneous of degree one function of the prices of the import good and
each of the J basic commodities (as this is a small open economy, the prices of both exports PXt
and imports PMt are given exogenously).
In practice, we will identify the prices of each of the national accounts expenditure aggregates
with their corresponding implicit price deators from the national accounts, and so we will not
emphasize the properties of these aggregators. However, they are useful in thinking about the
process of moving between the model and the data, and it is straightforward to show that a number
of popular models t into this framework:
Example 1. One-Sector Closed Economy Without Frictions
In this case, N = 1, HC (x;M) = HI (x;M) = x; and HG (x;M) = HX (x;M) = HQ (x;M) =
0; while all of the 0s are equal to zero. It is common to assume that that plants operate with a con-
stant returns to scale production function, in which case  = F = 0 (although this is not necessary;
see, for example, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2007).
10Example 2. One-Sector Closed Economy With Imperfect Competition and No Intermediate Inputs
This is the framework studied by Hall (1988) and extended by Basu and Fernald (2001), and
can be viewed as an extension of the previous case. Although the framework we have described
above is competitive, the equilibrium allocations will be identical for an appropriate choice of Lij =
Kij 6= 0; reecting the markup of price over marginal cost (which does not vary over factor inputs).
Example 3. One-Sector Open Economy
Abstracting from adjustment costs in capital, this is the model studied by Baxter and Crucini
(1994) which is the same as our rst case except HC (x;M) = HI (x;M) = HX (x;M) = x + M;
and HG (x;M) = HQ (x;M) = 0:
Example 4. Open Economy With Imported Intermediate Inputs
This is the case studied by Kehoe and Ruhl (2007) who also assume that labor supply and
capital are xed, so that U (C;1   L) = U (C);  = 0; and HI (x;M) = 0; that trade is always
balanced so that PXX = PMM and Bt = Bt+1 = 0; and that HC (x;M) = HX (x;M) = x; while
HG (x;M) = 0 and HQ (x;M) = M: In a leading example, Kehoe and Ruhl specialize to a Leontie
production function between the labor-capital aggregate and imported intermediate inputs.
Example 5. Two-Sector Open Economy
This case captures the model studied by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1991) who assume that
a country combines a single domestically produced good, that is also exported, with an imported good
to produce an aggregate that is used for consumption, investment and government spending. In our
framework, this translates to HX (x;M) = x; and HC (x;M) = HI (x;M) = HG (x;M):
3 Measuring Misallocation During The Argentine Crisis of 2001
The model introduced above is intended as a device to (1) measure the changing eciency
of the resource allocation during a nancial crisis; (2) account for the observed decline in mea-
sured productivity; and (3) measure the resulting change in welfare. In the next three sections we
implement each of these steps in turn using data from Argentina around the crisis of 2001.
The Argentine crisis is a natural case to examine both because of its size and prominence, but
also because of the greater availability of data for Argentina than for many other crisis countries.
The crisis ended a decade of relative stability following the end of the hyperinations of the late
eighties and the adoption of a currency board in which the peso was pegged to the US Dollar.
During the crisis, the government engaged in a series of debt restructuring negotiations that ended
11in one of the largest sovereign defaults in history in December 2001. At the same time, there was a
currency crisis that wiped out the convertibility regime (the currency board), a banking crisis, and
a \sudden stop" in capital inows.
This period was also associated with a dramatic decline in economic activity. Between the
peak in the rst quarter 1998 and trough in the rst quarter of 2002, GDP declined by almost 20
per-cent in real terms, with the sharpest declines occurring in the last quarter of 2001 and the rst
quarter of 2002 when the quarterly changes in output were -5.7 and -5.0 per-cent respectively.
3.A The Microeconomic Data
We obtained data on the performance of Argentine manufacturing establishments from the
annual industrial survey (Encuesta Industrial Anual) carried out by the Argentine Institute of
Statistics and Census (INDEC). This survey is conducted in March of each year; that is, the data
for 2001 were collected in March of 2002, three months after the worst of the crisis. Inclusion of
establishments in the survey is determined randomly within each of the 5 digit subsectors in the
Central Product Classication of the United Nations (we have a total of 22 subsectors).4 Each
establishment is followed over time for as long as it continues operation, with disappearing estab-
lishments replaced using the same sampling techniques. New entrants to the survey that have been
in existence for more than one year are distinguished from newly opened plants. The survey includes
a sample of approximately 4,000 establishments for the period 1996-2002 taken from the universe
of establishments with more than 10 workers. The universe of establishments with more than 10
workers constitutes only a small fraction of the number of establishments in the economy, but ac-
counts for approximately 80% of employment and more than 80% of output in the manufacturing
industry.5
The operational data provided by INDEC includes total wages, total hours worked, cost of
inputs, interest payments, expenditures in electricity, gas and other energy sources, total expendi-
tures, total sales in domestic and foreign markets (if any) and investment for each establishment
including the change in inventories. No balance sheet data are collected, and so we do not have a
direct estimate of the plants' capital stock. In order to preserve the anonymity of the respondents,
INDEC transformed all variables into per worker terms and provided only a partial indicator of the
plants employment: plants were classied as \small" if they had less than 80 workers, \medium"
4Examples of these subsectors are: Food Products and Beverages, Pulp and Paper, Textile products, Clothing
products, Radio, TV and Communication Devices, Furniture, etc.
5Employment in the manufacturing sector accounts for approximately 20% of total employment.
12with between 80 and 200 workers, and \large" with more than 200 workers. However, INDEC did
provide us with data on the growth rate of the number of workers, which allows us to capture the
evolution of each of the variables of interest.
This absence of exact data on the level of employment has no eect on the calculation of the
wedges (the 0s) reported below; it only aects the process by which we aggregate these results to
form conclusions about aggregate productivity in the next section. For this, we need an estimate
of the number of employees in each plant. We experimented with several methods for imputing
establishment size. For our benchmark method, we assume that each establishment has in 1996 {
the rst year of our sample { a number of workers equal to the midpoint of its size bin for small
and medium plants (45 workers for small plants, 140 for medium size ones). For the following years
we compute the number of workers for each establishment using the growth rate of the number
of workers. Whenever this method yielded, for a subsequent year, a number of workers that is
inconsistent with the size category reported for that plant, we adjust the initial number of workers
to place the establishment at the boundary of that size category. For large plants that do not change
size categories we set their number of workers so that we obtain the aggregate level of employment of
plants in the sample from the aggregated data. Except where noted in the text, and as discussed in
the appendix, our results are robust to a number of alternative methods for imputing establishment
size. Moreover, as shown in the appendix, our method yields aggregate data that closely match the
performance of the manufacturing sector.
In order to bring the production side of the model to the data we need to calibrate the
values of the production function parameters. We use industry aggregate data for Argentina for
the year 1997 to compute jj and jj (and hence also
 
1   j   j

j) for each year under
the assumption that wedges are zero in 1997.6 We assume that the decreasing returns to scale
parameter j = 0:9 for all j; which is in the neighborhood of estimates computed by Atkeson, Khan
and Ohanian (1996). For the purposes of calculating the wedges for each sector, however, all we
need to do is to compare factor usage at each plant with their average usage in the industry. The
only exception are the productivity wedges Aij: For this we calculate for each plant









This poses two challenges with our dataset as we do not observe directly the stock of capital, or
6As a robustness check we compute these parameters also using US data. Our results remain essentially unchanged.
13establishment level output and input prices.7 First, given the short period of time we are studying,
it is unlikely that the capital stock changed signicantly. However, it is very likely that the intensity
with which capital was used varied throughout the crisis. We describe in the next subsection how
we use information on energy consumption at each plant to measure variations in capital utilization.
Second, as we do not observe plant specic prices nor the real quantity of output, we use average
industry prices from IPIB for each manufacturing subsector to recover output from the value of
sales. And, as we do not observe plant specic input prices we use aggregate input prices from
INDEC's wholesale price index (IPIB:  Indice de Precios Internos B asicos) to recover the quantities
of of energy utilization, and intermediate inputs, from the data on expenditures in energy and the
cost of inputs.8 As the same input and output prices are used for all plants in an industry, they
have no eect on the distribution of relative wedges within that industry.
3.B Capital and Capital Services
Capital utilization is likely to have varied throughout the crisis. In addition, our establishment
level dataset does not include the balance sheet of the plant, and so we do not have estimates of
the book-value of the plants capital stock. Hence, we assume that capital devoted to production is









where Ei refers to purchases of energy, which is introduced as the J + 1'th primary commodity,
and 1= captures the number of units of energy required to power one unit of physical capital
which we assume is common across plants and sectors. We continue to assume that xed costs are
denominated in terms of capital, and not capital services. Then if the cost of energy and capital
rental, and their wedges, are given by PE; PK; Eij; and Kij; respectively, the market price of a
unit of capital services is
PKS = PE + PK;
7As explained above, we use our estimate of employment to compute an estimate of hours worked.
8Since inputs can be imported or produced domestically, we rst obtain the industry shares of imported and
domestic inputs using INDEC's input-output matrix from 1997, and then construct an industry average input price
from IPIB prices.










Hence, we can identify the capital wedge up to a constant (that is constant across plants and sectors
at a point in time) from
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The other plant level wedges can be obtained in a similar way from the equations in (3) above.
3.C Results
The following gures show the distribution of establishment productivity for surviving rms
in the sample for the years 1997, 1998 and 2002. The top and bottom 1% of observations were
excluded. We observe that between the relatively normal years of 1997 and 1998, there was little
change in this distribution. However, when comparing 2002 to 1997, we see that there was a marked





























Figure 1: Distribution of Total Factor Productivity in 1997, 1998 & 2002
The next three sets of gures present the analogous pictures for the dierent factor wedges. In
the rst set, we see that there was a fattening of the left tail in the labor wedge distribution between
1997 and 1998. Negative wedges suggest establishments are retaining more workers than desired,
which possibly reects an increase in labor hoarding between these years. However, at the same
time there was an increase in the density in the middle of the distribution. Between 1998 and 2002,
there was a substantial fattening of both of the tails of the distribution. This is consistent with a
15large decline in the eciency with which labor is allocated, with those establishments with negative
wedges wishing to reduce employment, and those with positive wedges wanting to increase their
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Figure 3: Distribution of Capital Wedge in 1997, 1998 & 2002
The following table presents some descriptive statistics for the joint distribution of wedges
and productivity in Argentina. The table shows that mean total factor productivity falls by 5%,
while the mean labor wedge rises, suggesting that on average establishments face more diculty
increasing their employment of labor. Both the wedges for capital and intermediate inputs fall
slightly on average.
Dispersion in productivity as well as both the labor and capital wedges also increase, with
the largest changes observed for the labor wedge. Dispersion in the intermediate wedge falls. Both
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Mean 6.35 0.93 1.95 3.15
Std Dev 2.76 0.68 1.35 3.02
90-10 6.12 1.58 2.17 7.25
75-25 2.70 0.87 1.01 3.25
Correlation
with Aij
1.00 0.12 0.80 0.23
2002
Mean 6.00 1.03 1.87 2.91
Std Dev 3.21 0.92 1.43 2.88
90-10 6.35 2.12 2.35 6.56
75-25 2.82 1.07 0.88 3.10
Correlation
with Aij
1.00 0.31 0.76 0.38
Table 1: Distribution of Wedges and Productivity in Argentina
the labor and intermediate input wedges become more correlated with output suggesting that the
most ecient establishments become more constrained in their ability to increase employment of
these factors, while the correlation with the capital wedge declines.
In the next section, we examine the consequences of these changes in the allocation of re-
sources across plants for aggregate productivity.
4 Accounting For Changes in Aggregate Productivity
In this section, we examine the extent to which changes in the allocation of resources account
for the changes in aggregate output and productivity.
174.A From Plant to Industry Output
Gross output of an industry is simply the sum of the gross output of each plant in the industry
(5). Ignoring the distinction between capital and capital services for the moment, and using the
form of the production function and our formulae for the allocation of factors across plants (7) we
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; (11)
captures the eect of the wedges on the allocation of resources and its impact on industry output.
Equation 10 establishes that industry j output is a constant returns to scale function of the inputs
devoted to production, Kj;Lj; and Qj; and the number of rms Nj; that is, it is as though the
number of rms is an extra factor of production.
Rearranging the free entry condition (4) we nd that the number of rms in an industry is








(1   Fij)(1   Kij)
:
This expression is quite intuitive: if xed costs PKF=PY are large, or returns to scale are close to
constant (  1); it is optimal for only a small number of plants to produce, and the number of














Equations (10) and (12) constitute a statement of Viner's classic result: even though there are
decreasing returns at the plant level, with free entry the industry acts as though it has constant
returns to scale by varying the number of plants in operation, each of which produces at the minimum
of its (expected) average cost curve.
184.B Industry Productivity and Intra-Industry Misallocation
Equation (12) also shows that, if we know the output elasticities j and j, and calculate
measured industry productivity, ^ Aj; by dividing gross output by the output-elasticity-geometric-








That is, measured industry productivity depends on: the fundamental level of total factor produc-
tivity in the industry Aj; a term j that captures the eciency of the allocation of resources across
plants with dierent productivities Aij; and its misallocation caused by the dierent costs of hiring
factors Kij; Lij; and Qij; and a term j which captures the eciency with which the number of
plants in the industry varies.
To illustrate the role of allocative ineciency in determining industry j measured productiv-
ity, dierentiate (11) with respect to time to show that changes in j are the result of two eects:











































































































To understand R1j; it is useful to consider a number of thought experiments. First, suppose











If all plants start with the same technology level (Aij = 0 for all i 2 j) so that all rms are of the
same size (Yij = Yj), and there is a mean preserving spread in the distribution of Aij's, there is no
19eect on industry measured TFP; this is a consequence of the envelope theorem. If, however, some
plants begin with dierent TFP levels, the eect of a mean preserving change in the distribution of
Aij's depends on whether the variance of the distribution of productivity increases (in which case
the most ecient plants, Yij > Y ; become more productive d(1   Aij) > 0 so thatR1 > 0) in which
case productivity rises, or the variance decreases (the least ecient plants, Yij < Y ; become more
productive d(1   Aij) > 0 so that R1 < 0) in which case productivity falls. In other words, there
is a tendency for increases in the variance of productivity levels to increase aggregate productivity
as production is reallocated towards the most ecient plants.
Second, suppose that all plants have the same scale (Aij = ij = 0 for all i 2 j), but that
there are relative factor price distortions. This places a strong restriction on relative movements in
the wedges on each factor, and so for simplicity we assume that the wedges on L are unchanged at











































In this case, the largest users of intermediate inputs are also the smallest users of capital, and





> 0 for plants with Kij=Kj   Qij=Qj < 0 and industry productivity falls. This result
holds more generally, allowing us to conclude that there is a tendency for increases in the variance
of factor wedges to decrease aggregate productivity.
To understand R2j, note that by denition,
P
i2j d
i = 0; and so if all plants were identical
R2j = 0: When there is heterogeneity, however, everything else equal, an increase in the share of
types producing above average amount of output increases productivity (R2j > 0) as this represents
an increase in the share of the most productive plants. Conversely, everything else equal, an increase
in the share of the largest factor users reduces productivity (R2j < 0) as this represents an increase
in the most distorted plants.
Next, to understand the role of changes in the eciency of plant turnover in producing























(1   Fij)(1   Kij)
:
These terms reect the consequences of decreasing returns at a plant level for industry productivity.
If the price of capital rises faster than the price of output, real xed costs rise and variations in
output are met with smaller changes in the number of plants and larger increases in incumbent
plant production, which reduces industry productivity because of decreasing returns. On the other
hand, if xed costs fall, or there is a shift in the distribution of plants towards those with lower xed
costs, productivity is increased.
Another issue that arises is related to the fact that we are using the variation in the con-
sumption of power to capture changes in the amount of capital services utilized by the plant. In
some practical applications this might not be possible, and it would be necessary for the researcher
to allow for the fact that we typically cannot distinguish between an increase in total capital from
an increase in capital used in production. Combining the denition of aggregate capital with the
free entry condition (4) and the plant's rst order condition in capital services from (3) yields the
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That is, total capital demand will grow faster than total capital used in production if either more
rms enter at lower scale (d= > 0) or if there is a relative reduction in the use of capital per unit
of output produced (d =  > 0).
When data on power consumption is available, the analysis is modied in two ways. First,
purchases of energy must now be subtracted from gross output to compute value added. Second,
the relationship between total capital in an industry KTj, and capital services devoted to production




















Now, if the price of energy rises making the price of capital services rise faster than the price of
capital, the ratio of capital to capital services in the industry rises.
4.C Aggregate Productivity and Inter-Industry Misallocation
Finally, we use our measures of productivity at the plant and industry levels to obtain
measures of aggregate productivity. As we will see below when we discuss welfare, and has been
stressed by other authors, the appropriate measure of productivity growth for welfare purposes
takes the growth rate of value added and subtracts the growth rates of capital and labor weighted
by factor shares computed using the social cost of supplying those factors. In the framework
introduced above, we assumed that households receive the undistorted capital and labor prices, and
hence we should weight factor input growth by their simple factor shares, resulting in the traditional
denition of total factor productivity of the economy that we denote TFP1: If this assumption is
not satised, we would need to adjust our welfare measure with terms that multiply the change in
the aggregate supply of capital and labor by the deviation of market prices from social costs.
In practice, the capital share of income is dicult to measure due to the possible presence
of xed costs and pure prots. As a result, the large falls in TFP observed during most emerging
market nancial crises have been measured using a version of Solow's (1957) residual in which the

















which we denote TFP2.
To connect our aggregate measures of TFP with our industry and plants level discussion of






and hence the growth rate of real GDP is given by the value added weighted average growth rates











22To compute the aggregate Solow residual, we will need to subtract aggregate factor share weighted















j is industry j's share of aggregate value added. For capital, the measurement issues
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which is the value added weighted average of the growth in industry Solow residuals adjusted for
the capital share measurement issues discussed above.10
Finally, to connect with industry and plant level data, which is presented in terms of gross





















































































23Substituting for the change in output in (16) by taking the derivative of equation (12),
substituting for industry factor shares from (8) and (9), replacing the change in capital used in
production by the change in total capital from (13), and rearranging, we obtain that the growth in










































1   j   j
 
1   j (1   Q)
 dQj
Qj
+jj (Kj   K)
dKj
Kj





1   j   j






where K;L and Q are the output weighted average wedges on capital, labor and intermediate
inputs across industries.
This equation decomposes the change in the traditional Solow residual TFP into ve com-
ponents. The rst line of this equation captures three components: a weighted average of industry
technology growth; the misallocation within sectors, including any misallocation resulting from en-
try and exit; and the mismeasurement that results when we use the growth rate of aggregate capital
instead of the growth rate of capital used in production. The second line captures the eect of
mismeasuring output elasticities in the computation of the Solow residual.
The third line is new and captures the eect of the changing misallocation of factors across
sectors. This term will be zero if either there is no inter-industry reallocation occurring (so that
dKj=Kj = dLj=Lj = dQj=Qj = 0 for all j), or if marginal products are equated across industries (so
that  Kj =  K,  Lj =  L; and  Qj =  Q for all j). Otherwise, the changing allocation of resources
across sectors will aect measured aggregate productivity. To see this, take the example of labor.
If, as a result of dierent wedges in dierent industries, labor has a higher marginal product in
industry j than on average (or Lj > L) a reallocation of labor to this industry, and away from
lower marginal product industries, will increase the Solow residual.
4.D Results
Ideally, to apply the above methodology to Argentine data, we should possess plant level data
for the entire economy which could then be compared with national accounts data. However, our
plant level data covers only the manufacturing sector. In addition, Argentine national accounts data
(in common with the data for many other countries) are subject to potentially serious measurement
24error due to the widespread use of the single deation method in constructing estimates of aggregate
value added. We discuss these issues in more detail in an appendix, and simply note for now that, as
a consequence of these concerns we focus entirely on estimates for the manufacturing sector derived
from our sample data, treating our sample as representative of both the entire manufacturing sector,
and of the entire Argentine economy.
Table 2: Accounting For The Fall in Argentine Productivity
All Plants
Change From 1997 (% Chained)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Manufacturing Total Factor Productivity (TFP2) -7.45 -6.06 -3.45 -11.45 -5.88
Intra Industry Misallocation -3.66 -1.67 -0.47 -7.28 -1.96
Inter Industry Misallocation -0.47 0.57 1.01 -0.17 -1.19
Residual (Technology and Mismeasurement) -3.32 -4.96 -4.09 -4.00 -2.73
Table 2 reports the change in Solow residual derived from our data, and decomposes the
sources of its changes into four main components. The change in each component from one year to
the next was calculated at an industry level, aggregated using the Tornqvist approximation to the
Divisia index and then chained to produce an estimate of the change relative to 1997. The results
were robust to using a Fisher Ideal index.
As shown in the Table, our measure of the Solow residual drops dramatically in 1998 before
recovering somewhat in 1999 and 2000, only to drop dramatically once again in 2001 reaching a
trough of 11.45% below its previous peak. The Solow residual then recovers sharply in 2002 mirroring
the sharp recovery in the entire economy. The contribution of intra-sector misallocation mirrors this
pattern, explaining half of the initial decline in 1998, producing almost all of the decline between
2000 and 2001, and accounting for roughly two-thirds of the cumulative decline in the Solow residual
to that point. A recovery in intra-industry misallocation in 2002 results in this item accounting for
slightly more than one-third of the entire movement in the Solow residual between 1997 and 2002.
The contribution of inter-industry misallocation is more modest with the exception of between
2001 and 2002 where it led to a full percentage point decline in the Solow residual and ends up
accounting for one-fth of the entire change between 1998 and 2002. It total, our methodology
nds that changes in the allocation of resources account for almost two-thirds of the decline in the
Solow residual from the previous peak in 1997 to the trough of the crisis in 2001, and more than
25half of the decline up to 2002. Consequently, the residual term, which captures both the underlying
changes in total factor productivity plus measurement error terms is never more than 5 per-cent
below its level in 1997 and accounts for only one-third of the drop into the trough of 2001 at the
height of the crisis.
All of the results above have been computed for the entire sample of plants used to measure
the wedges in Section 3. A feature of the data through this period is that there was a large amount
of turnover in the plants represented in the survey, with a large number of plants exiting the survey
in 2001. The methodology of the survey species that a plant should remain in the survey as
long as it remains in operation, and so we have interpreted this exit from the survey as exit from
production. However, it is plausible that non-response rates increased during the crisis, and that
ability of INDEC to monitor non-compliance decreased.
Table 3: Accounting For The Fall in Argentine Productivity
Continuing Plants
Change From 1997 (% Chained)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Manufacturing Total Factor Productivity (TFP2) -1.00 -1.87 -0.48 -9.53 -11.30
Intra Industry Misallocation -0.77 -0.10 -2.01 -3.04 -5.83
Inter Industry Misallocation 0.36 -0.14 0.30 -0.45 0.10
Residual (Technology and Mismeasurement) -0.59 -1.63 1.23 -6.04 -5.57
To examine the eect of this exit with a view to both establishing the robustness of our
results, and towards an understanding of the role of plant turnover in aecting the eciency of
the allocation of resources, Table 3 replicates the analysis of Table 2 for the subset of all plants
that responded to the survey in every year form 1997 to 2002. In contrast to the results on the
entire sample, the declines in the Solow residual computed using data form the sample of continuing
plants are more modest in 1998, and yet more severe in 2001. There is also no increase in the Solow
residual between 2001 and 2002.
The eect of intra-industry misallocation is still very large, accounting for more than three-
quarters of the initial decline in the Solow residual in 1998, slightly less than one-third of the decline
in the height of the crisis, are more than half of the overall decline by 2002. This is consistent
with the idea that in the initial years of the crisis, a number of relatively ecient plants exited
production, only to be replaced by plants that were either more ecient, or more able to increase
26eciency, in 2002 as the economy responded to the crisis. Inter-industry misallocation has more
modest eects using the sample of continuing plants, suggesting that the bulk of inter-industry
reallocation is accounted for by the exit and entry of new plants. Overall, misallocation accounts
for roughly one-third of the decline in TFP to 2001, and half of the decline to 2002.
5 Measuring The Change in Aggregate Welfare
The above Sections explore the extent to which changes in the eciency of the resource
allocation across sectors accounts for changes in measured Solow residuals. But how much did these
changes matter for welfare? In this section, we develop an approach for answering this question.
Unlike Lucas' (1988) direct approach to measuring the costs of business cycles, we follow Domar
(1961), Weitzman (1976), and Basu and Fernald (2002) in pursuing a dual approach to welfare
measurement that starts with the value function of the presentative agent of a country. This has
the important advantage of allowing us to avoid using data on consumption and labor supply which
are notoriously unreliable for many developing and emerging market countries11. Moreover, the
approach, in common with the literature on sucient statistics for welfare analysis (see Chetty 2009
for a review), places few restrictions on the underlying preferences of agents in the economy.
As welfare is a forward looking object, it is necessary to be precise as to the time the crisis
became anticipated. We assume that the economy experiences an international nancial crisis at
time t; which we interpret as an unanticipated change in the prices at which goods trade interna-
tionally, the world interest rate, and the entire distribution of wedges faced by rms. To begin, we
think of the crisis as lasting only one period and then extend the framework to consider a persis-
tent crisis below when we take the framework to the data. To measure the eect of the crisis, we
need to specify what would have happened in the absence of a crisis. This assumption is especially
important: if we assumed that the economy would have remained at a permanently higher income
level, the welfare costs of the crisis would be very large. As a response to this concern, we adopt
what we consider to be a conservative approach: we assume that in the absence of the crisis at time
t; all variables would have remained at their t   1 levels.
In general, the entire equilibrium allocation will be aected by the nancial crisis. The change
11See Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Kydland and Zarazaga (2002) for a discussion of problems with emerging
market employment and hours data with a specic focus on Argentina; see Loayza, Lopez, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven
(1998) for a discussion of problems with the measurement of consumption.
27in household welfare as a result of the crisis is given by
























where we have dropped the time subscripts and denote future variables with an apostrophe. Sub-
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Using the national expenditure identity for real GDP, and denoting the shares of the major























































where we have allowed dB to be non-zero, despite the fact that it is usually thought of as predeter-
mined, to allow for valuation eects on the stock of net foreign assets and for reductions in debt as
a result of a default and debt restructuring. Using the former to substitute for the growth rate of










































where we have denoted the factor shares of value added by !V
K and !V
L:
That is, the change in welfare is given by four terms. The rst is a measure of TFP growth,
dened as the dierence between the growth rate of value added and the factor share weighted
growth rates of capital and labor. Note that our assumption that households face undistorted
market prices is important here, because it enables us to measure the social cost of devoting labor
or capital to production from their market prices. In the absence of this assumption, we would need
28to measure the size of the deviation between the market price of a factor and its social cost.
The second term captures the welfare eects of any changes in government spending. If
government spending is valued by the household and the government determines G benevolently,
the marginal value of an extra unit of government spending equals its cost,  0 (G)dG = PG;
and this term disappears. If government spending is not valued, then  0(G) =  (G) = 0 and
we should subtract government spending from our measure of gross national income in calculating
the the economy's ability to produce income and purchase goods. In what follows we focus on
the benevolent government case (although we also present results for the case of purely wasteful
government spending).
The third term is an adjustment for changes in the terms of trade; if the price the country
receives for its exports rises less than the price it pays for its imports, welfare is reduced. This
adjustment diers form the usual terms of trade adjustment used to compute real Gross National
Income (referred to as command basis Gross National Product in the US). Although there is no
consensus as to the ideal method for computing the terms of trade adjustment (see the debate
in Geary 1961 or the range of recommendations given in the United Nations' System of National
Accounts 1993 in paragraphs 16.152 to 16.156; our adjustment was recommended by Rasmusen
1960 and Hamada and Iwata 1984), many countries follow Nicholson (1959) and use an import price











which is equivalent to our adjustment only when trade is balanced. The fourth and nal term
corresponds to the change in income from net foreign assets, as well as to changes in the net foreign
assets position as a result of, for example, a sovereign default12.
Before applying this framework to the data, it is useful to examine how this framework would
be applied to our example economies introduced above.
Example 1 (Continued). One-Sector Closed Economy Without Frictions







12It is possible to derive an equivalent expression with TFP measured using gross national income (GNI) growth,
subtracting factor growth weighted by shares in GNI.
29which restates the result of Solow (1957). Moreover, as rst shown by Weitzman (1976) for the
case of linear utility and later shown more generally by Basu and Fernald (2002), our expressions










Example 2 (Continued). One-Sector Closed Economy With Imperfect Competition and No Inter-
mediate Inputs
Relative to the previous example, the only dierence is that there is now a wedge between the
prices paid by consumers and the marginal cost faced by rms which is given by the mark-up. We
represent this in our framework by setting 1   Ki = 1   Li = (1 + )





































which is the analogue of equations (14) and (28) in Basu and Fernald [5] (with only one sector, the
sectoral-reallocation terms are set to zero).
Example 3 (Continued). One-Sector Open Economy Without Frictions
Next we consider a one-sector open economy without frictions and with unbalanced trade. As
for the closed economy version studied above, the relative prices of investment, consumption and





















Example 4 (Continued). Small Open Economy with Imported Intermediate Inputs




which is Kehoe and Ruhl's main point: if output is measured ideally, changes in the terms of trade
will have no eect on the measured Solow residual. Below we will argue that output is typically not
30measured ideally (that is, it is not measured using double deation), and instead is often measured









This shows that movements in the terms of trade can impact measured Solow residuals, which serves
as a counterpoint to the argument in Bajona, Kehoe and Ruhl (2008).



















In the special case where output is Leontie in primary factors and imported intermediates (here
Q = M), we know dY=Y = dM=M: Moreover, since primary factors are constant, if we assume









That is, if the price of imports rises (the terms of trade worsen), welfare falls by an amount propor-
tional to the share of imports in gross domestic product. Interestingly, in this case, measuring the
Solow residual from output incorrectly constructed using single deation leads to a correct estimate
of the change in welfare.
Example 5 (Continued). Two-Sector Open Economy Without Frictions






























In the analysis above, we assumed that the crisis was a surprise when it occurred, and lasted
for only one period. In many applications, crises are anticipated in advance of their occurrence
and last for multiple periods. As shown in the timeline above, for example, the Argentine crisis
was being forecast as early as April 1998 when IMF ocials warned of a possible \meltdown", and
31continued at least through the rst half of 2002. This has no eect on our analysis of the Solow
residual above given the assumptions of our model. However, as consumers are forward looking,
it will have an impact on the change in welfare. In particular, when we calculate the change in
household welfare, we must now take into account the change in tomorrows value function, as well
as the change in its value resulting from dierent accumulation decisions.
Under our assumption that the economy would have remained in its pre-crisis state in the-
duration of the crisis, the welfare eects of multiperiod crises are straightforward to analyze13.
Replicating the derivations above we nd that the change in welfare now includes another term











































V V 0 :
Hence, writing the growth rate of nominal value added as the product of the rate of ination 0 and

















1 + 0 :
That is, we can simply iterate on this analysis and accumulate using a growth adjusted real interest
rate.
5.B Results
Table 4 collects our measurements on the components of the change in welfare as a result of
the crisis. Each element of the table refers to the ow contribution of each component for that year
relative to its level in 1997. As above, we compute these changes using the Tornqvist approximation
to the Divisia Index. For the reasons discussed above we use the sample of continuing plants to
compute the aggregate Solow residual (the appendix contains the same Table using data from all
plants).
13Without this assumption, we would need to specify the path of all variables in the absence of a crisis and measure
changes relative to this path.
32Table 4: The Change in Welfare and its Components against 1997
Continuing Plants
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Solow Residual  1:00  1:87  0:48  9:53  11:30














































To obtain the appropriate measurement for welfare purposes we need to correct the Solow
residual for the mismeasurement of the capital share of output. Doing so results in slightly smaller




















Figure 5: The Prices of Exports and Imports
The third line in the Table captures the contribution of changes in export and import prices
on welfare. For most years this is quite modest reecting the fact that, early in the crisis, Argentine
14We estimate the mismeasurement using aggregate data on the evolution of the stock of capital and returns to
capital from INDEC.
33trade was close to balanced. The exception is the year 2002, where changes in tradeable goods
prices produced a 10 per-cent positive contribution to welfare. The reason is that, as shown in
Figure 5, in 2000 Argentina had transitioned from a net importer to a net exporter. Moreover, as
a result of the depreciation in the Argentine peso, both export and import prices in pesos roughly
tripled in one year. As Argentina was a net exporter (and by 2002, a substantial net exporter) the
higher prices in pesos received for its exports more than oset the higher prices paid for imports
resulting in a substantial increase in welfare.
The fourth line in the Table captures the contribution from changes in income derived from
Argentina's foreign investment position. The numbers are negative each year reecting the fact
that Argentina is a net debtor and that the income owed on these debts was increasing each year.
The increase is especially large in 2002; despite the write-down in the country's foreign debts, the
depreciation of the peso resulted in a large increase in income paid to foreigners which contributed
a 2.5 per-cent reduction in welfare that year.
It is important to stress that this result uses current account data measured on a cash-ow
basis, which includes the reduction in foreign interest payments as a result of the sovereign default.
This does not, however, capture the eect of expected reductions in future debt service as a result
of the sovereign default at the end of 2001. The appendix discusses a number of measurement
issues associated with these data, and describes an alternative that aims to capture the reduction in
the value of Argentina's foreign debt resulting from the default. With this adjustment, the default
makes a positive 0.4% contribution to welfare in 2002.
If we assume that the government of Argentina is benevolent and sets its expenditure at the
point where its marginal social cost equals its marginal social benet, then we nd that the ow
eect on welfare is driven predominantly by movements in total factor productivity in every year
from 1998 to 2001. Negative contributions from foreign trade in goods and factors rarely exceed ve
per-cent of the contribution from productivity. The resulting changes in ow welfare vary from -3.5
to -11.5 per-cent of one years GDP. In 2002, by contrast, the large positive contribution from traded
goods prices more than osets the negative contribution from productivity and all other factors,
resulting in an increase in ow welfare of 2.3 per-cent of that years GDP.
To compute the total eect on welfare of the crisis, we need to cumulate the discounted
ow changes in welfare. To do so, we use a discount rate of 5 per-cent per year, and assume that
the crisis ends in 2003 with all real variables returning to the level they would have been had no
crisis occurred. We view the latter as conservative; if the crisis had permanent eects the change in
34welfare would be much larger. Cumulating welfare ows in this way we nd that the crisis reduced
Argentine welfare by an amount equivalent to a 24.6 per-cent reduction in 1998 GDP. Adjusting
the contribution from net foreign income to account for the sovereign default, this number rises to
-22.3% of 1998 GDP.
If we assume that the government of Argentina is not benevolent, or for some other reason
(perhaps due to political economy problems or through the use of distortionary taxation) is unable
to equate the social costs and benets of its spending, we need to take a stand on how far away from
the optimum this spending is. As a more or less natural benchmark, we focus on the case in which
government spending is purely wasteful. As shown in lines ve and six of the Table, depending on
whether or not government investment is also considered wasteful, the contribution to welfare from
the direct spending of the government is typically on the order of one-half to one per-cent of GDP,
negative in periods where government spending rose, and positive when it declined.
Computing the change in welfare as a result of changes in government spending, we nd
that the welfare numbers are similar to the case with an optimal government. This reects the
fact that the changes in government spending were quite small, and that the government is only a
modest component of the overall Argentine economy. Cumulating these discounted welfare ows,
we nd that the decline in welfare is slightly larger at an amount equivalent to 27 per-cent of 1998
GDP, using only government consumption, falling back to 25.4 per-cent if government investment
is included. The reason is that the increases in government spending in the early years of the crisis
oset the large fall in government spending in 2002 as the borrowing constraints on the government
tightened.
It is, of course, important to be cautious in interpreting these welfare change numbers. Most
importantly, our estimates have been designed to be conservative. For one thing, the fact that
the sovereign default has still not been fully resolved as of this writing, and access to international
capital markets remains limited, suggest that the declines in welfare might extend beyond 2002.
At the same time, our assumption of a representative agent means that we do not account for the
heterogeneous impact of the crisis on dierent Argentine citizens. Finally, our model has nothing
to say about the eects of involuntary unemployment on welfare.
6 Conclusions
Financial crises in emerging market economies appear to be very costly. In this paper, we
presented a theoretically consistent methodology for calculating the welfare costs of a crisis (or any
35economic shock) on a small open economy and for decomposing these welfare costs into the eect
of changes in the terms of trade, the terms of foreign investments, changes in government spending,
and changes in an economies productive capacity. We use the framework also to measure the impact
of changes in the eciency of the resource allocation mechanism in productive capacity.
We then applied this methodology to Argentina for the 2001 { 2002 nancial crisis using a
mixture of aggregate data, and plant level data drawn from a unique dataset. Using conservative
assumptions, we found that welfare fell by an amount equivalent to roughly a 25 per-cent in GDP
as a result of the crisis. The largest amount of this decline is due to declines in the measured
productivity of the Argentine economy, although substantial osetting improvements in tradeable
goods prices, and potentially also tighter constraints on government spending, were also signicant.
Using micro data on manufacturing plants, we show that, of the decline in productivity, more than
half can be explained by a decline in the eciency of the resource allocation mechanism which shows
up with an increasingly poor allocation of factors across plants as the crisis progresses.
Our framework can applied in a number of areas. Focusing on the measurement of welfare
changes, an advantage of our framework is that it provides a single theoretically consistent measure
of welfare change that is related to, but distinct from, measures currently in use for measuring real
national income and total factor productivity. Thus, it allows researchers to replace the patchwork
collection of facts that usually passes for a quantication of the social costs of crises. Applying this
measure to a wide range of crises also holds out the promise of being able to identify the types of
crises, and their features, that are most important in aecting welfare. For example, we may be
able to ascertain whether sovereign defaults are, on average, more costly that currency crises, and
whether this works primarily through changes in the terms of trade, or changes in the ability of the
economy to produce output.
To the extent that changes in the eciency of the resource allocation mechanism prove to be
the most important channel, this begs the question of the precise mechanism by which a crisis aects
the allocation. It seems plausible that nancial crises, which often result in severe disruption of the
domestic nancial sector, would lead to a decline in the eciency with which nancial intermediation
occurs. It also seems plausible that, to the extent to which credit mechanisms are important in
facilitating exchange, a decline in the eciency of nancial intermediate may lead to a deterioration
in the operation of labor markets (through the availability of working capital, as in Neumeyer and
Perri 2004) or intermediate input markets (as in Mendoza and Yue 2008). In future work, we plan
to study the details of the evolution of the wedges computed above with a view to discriminating
36between these dierent mechanisms.
37References
[1] Arellano, Cristina and Enrique Mendoza. (2003). \Credit Frictions and 'Sudden Stops' in Small
Open Economies: An Equilibrium Business Cycle Framework for Emerging Markets Crises."
in Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis: Theory and Policy in General Equilibrium S. Altug, J.
Chadha and C. Nolan (Eds.) Cambridge U. Press, 8880.
[2] Backus, David K., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Finn E. Kydland. (1992). \International Real Business
Cycles." The Journal of Political Economy, 100:4, pp. 745-75.
[3] Backus, David K., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Finn E. Kydland. (1994). \Dynamics of the Trade
Balance and the Terms of Trade: The J-Curve?" The American Economic Review, 84:1, pp.
84-103.
[4] Baily, M.N., Hulten, C., Campbell, D. (1992). \Productivity dynamics in manufacturing
plants." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Microeconomics) 1, 187{267.
[5] Basu, Susanto and John G. Fernald. (2002). \Aggregate Productivity and Aggregate Technol-
ogy." European Economic Review, 46:6, pp. 963-91.
[6] Basu, Susanto, Luigi Pascali, Fabio Schiantarelli, and Luis Serven. (2009). \Productivity, Wel-
fare and Reallocation: Theory and Firm-Level Evidence." NBER Working Paper, 15579.
[7] Baxter, Marianne and Mario J. Crucini. (1995). \Business Cycles and the Asset Structure of
Foreign Trade." International Economic Review, 36:4, pp. 821-54.
[8] Benjamin, David and Felipe Meza. (2007). \Total Factor Productivity and Labor Reallocation:
the Case of the Korean 1997 Crisis." University of Southhampton Working Paper.
[9] Bhutta, Zulqar A., Fauzia Ahmad Bawany, Asher Feroze, and Arjumand Rizvi. (2008). "The
Impact of the Food and Economic Crisis on Child Health and Nutrition." UNICEF Working
Paper.
[10] Chari, V.V., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Ellen R. McGrattan. (2005). \Sudden Stops and Output
Drops." American Economic Review, 95:2, pp. 381-87.
[11] Chari, V.V., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Ellen R. McGrattan. (2006). \Business Cycle Accounting."
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Sta Report, 328.
[12] Chetty, R. (2009). "Sucient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and
Reduced-Form Methods." Annual Review of Economics 1(1): 451-488.
[13] Christiano, Lawrence J., Christopher Gust, and Jorge Roldos. (2004). \Monetary policy in a
nancial crisis." Journal of Economic Theory, 119:1, pp. 64-103.
[14] Domar, E.D. (1961). \On the measurement of technical change." Economic Journal 71, 710{
729.
[15] Foster, Lucia., John Haltiwanger and C.J. Krizan. (2001). \Aggregate Productivity Growth:
Lessons From Microeconomic Evidence." in Edward Dean, Michael Harper and Charles Hulten
(Eds). New Developments in Productivity Analysis.
38[16] Geary, R. C. (1961) \Problems in the Deation of National Accounts: Introduction", Review
of Income and Wealth, series 9, 1961.
[17] Gopinath, Gita & Brent Neiman. (2011) \Trade Adjustment and Productivity in Large Crises",
NBER Working Papers 16958.
[18] Hall, Robert E. (1988). \The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry." The
Journal of Political Economy, 96:5, pp. 921-47.
[19] Hall, Robert E. (1990). \Invariance properties of Solow's productivity residual." In: Diamond,
P. (Ed.), Growth, Productivity, Employment. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[20] Hamada, Koichi and Iwata, Kazumasa (1984) \National Income, Terms of Trade and Economic
Welfare" The Economic Journal, 94 (376) pp. 175-171.
[21] Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Peter J. Klenow. (2007). \Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in
China and India." National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[22] Hulten, C., (1978). \Growth accounting with intermediate inputs." Review of Economic Studies
45, 511{518.
[23] International Monetary Fund. (2004). Balance of Payments Manual, 5th Edition. Washington
D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
[24] Kehoe, Timothy J. and Kim J. Ruhl. (2006). \Sudden Stops, Sectoral Reallocations, and the
Real Exchange Rate" Unpublished Paper, University of Minnesota.
[25] Kehoe, Timothy J. and Kim J. Ruhl. (2008). \Are shocks to the terms of trade, shocks to
productivity?" Unpublished paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[26] Knowles, James C., Ernesto M. Pernia, and Mary Racelis. (1999). "Social Conseuqences of the
Financial Crisis in Asia." Asian Development Bank Sta Paper, 60.
[27] Kydland, F.E., Zarazaga, C.E.J.M., (2002). \Argentina's lost decade." Review of Economic
Dynamics 5 (1), 152{165.
[28] Lee, Joung-Woo. (2004). "Social Impacts of the Crisis," in The Korean Economy Beyond the
Crisis. D.-K. Chung and Barry Eichengreen eds. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
[29] Loayza, N., H. Lopez, K. Schmidt-Hebbel and L. Serven. (1998). The World Saving Database.
World Bank Working Paper.
[30] Lucas, R.E., (1988). Models of business cycles. Yrj o Jahnsson lectures. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
115.
[31] Meza, Felipe and Erwan Quintin. (2005). \Financial Crises and Total Factor Productivity."
Center for Latin American Economics Working Paper, 0105.
[32] Mendoza, Enrique. (2006). \Endogenous Sudden Stops in a Business Cycle Model with Collat-
eral Constraints: A Fisherian Deation of Tobin's Q." University of Maryland Working Paper.
[33] Mendoza, Enrique and Katherine A. Smith. (2006). \Quantitative Implications of a Debt-
Deation Theory of Sudden Stops and Asset Prices." Journal of International Economics.
39[34] Mendoza, Enrique G. and Vivian Z. Yue. (2007). \Solving the Country Risk - Business Cycle
Disconnect: Endogenous Output Collapse in a Model of Sovereign Default." Unpublished Paper,
University of Maryland.
[35] Neumeyer, Pablo A. and Fabrizio Perri. (2005). \Business cycles in emerging economies: the
role of interest rates." Journal of Monetary Economics, 52:2, pp. 345-80.
[36] Nicholson, J. L. (1960). \The Eects of International Trade on the Measurement of Real
National Income." The Economic Journal, Vol. 70, No. 279 (Sep., 1960), pp. 608-612.
[37] Petrin, Amil and James Levinsohn. (2005). \Measuring Aggregate Productivity Growth Using
Plant Level Data." Unpublished paper, University of Michigan.
[38] Rasmussen, P. N. (1956). Studies in Inter-Sectoral Relations. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[39] Restuccia, Diego and Richard Rogerson. (2003). \Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity
with Heterogeneous Plants." University of Toronto Working Paper.
[40] Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban and Mark L. J. Wright. (2007). \Establishment Size Dynamics in the
Aggregate Economy." American Economic Review, 97:5, pp. 1639-66.
[41] Shari, Ishak. (2001). "Financial Crisis and its Social Impact in Malaysia," in The Social Impact
of the Asian Financial Crisis. Yun-Peng Chu and Hal Hill eds. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
[42] Solow, Robert M. (1957). \Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function." The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 39:3, pp. 312-20.
[43] Stuvel, G. (1959) \Asset Revaluation and Terms of Trade Eects in the Framework of the
National Accounts". Economic Journal, Vol. LXIX, no. 274, June 1959, pp. 275-292.
[44] Suryahadi, Asep, Sudarno Sumarto, Yusuf Suharso, and Lant Pritchett. (2000). "The Evolution
of Poverty during the Crisis in Indonesia, 1996-99." World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper, 2435.
[45] Weitzman, Martin L. (1976). \On the Welfare Signicance of National Product in a Dynamic
Economy." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90:1, pp. 156-62.
407 Ecient Industry Productivity
In the text, we dene the industry j productivity level, Aj; as the level that would arise
if all factor input wedge were zero so that factors were eciently allocated across plants. In this
appendix, we elaborate on the process of dening Aj and discuss one alternative denition.
7.A Ecient Allocation Given N
Recall that our measure of misallocation within an industry, ; (suppressing the industry
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Intuitively, we desire a measure of that reaches a maximum if and only if all factor wedges are zero
(so that there is no misallocation of factors). We set industry productivity level A to normalize
this maximum value of  to one. That is, we dene industry productivity so that when all wedges
except for the Ai are zero,  = 1.
If we set all factor wedges to zero, then for any denition of industry productivity (which









































which generates the desired result.
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That is, instead of taking the arithmetic average
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when raised to the power  these terms will not sum to one.
We can establish a few properties of this measure. For example, it is straightforward to show
that if all plants in industry j have the same productivity level Ai = A for all i; then Aj = A:
Likewise, the fact that f (x) = x is concave for  2 (0;1) and that the Ai are non-negative implies
that our measure of industry productivity is greater than the arithmetic average productivity level
of plants.
Lemma 1. Let  A =
P
i iAi: Then A1   A:




































where the rst inequality follows from the fact that the iAi=  A are non-negative and sum to one,
and hence constitute a probability measure so that we can apply Jensen's inequality. The second
inequality follows from the fact that Ai=  A is positively correlated with Yi=Y . The third line follows
from the denition of Y :
Finally, note that if we x the number of plants and the total supply of factors to an industry,
the allocation of resources across establishment types generated by the market maximizes aggregate
TFP.
42Lemma 2. Given the total number of establishments N; the total supply of factors to an industry
K;L;Q, and in the absence of factor distortions, the allocation of resources across establishment
types generated by the market maximizes aggregate TFP.
Proof. The allocation that maximizes TFP, given factor inputs to the industry is the allocation that
maximizes output (as N is xed, we do not need to distinguish between capital used by plant and






































which along with the constraints serves to pin down the optimum. But these are the same equations
as the ones that solve for the competitive equilibrium allocation derived in the text (given factor
supplies) with K = PK=PY etc.
The above result, which characterizes optimal allocations within an industry given the total
number of establishments and given an aggregate allocation across industries, is a necessary condi-
tion for an optimal allocation overall although it is not sucient because N and the factor allocation
may not be optimal. Next we study what happens if we endogenize N.
7.B Endogenizing N




We want to compute the dierence between
 
A1 1= as measured from the data, and the level
it would attain without factor distortions. In the previous subsections, constructed A such that



















so that 2 captures dierences from optimal A in a Solow accounting exercise on industry data.
We do not follow this approach in the paper because we view it as less intuitive that the
approach of the previous subsection. In particular, note that if all wedges were zero so that Ai = A









and the measure does not move one-for-one with rm productivity.
Nonetheless, this alternative denition of industry productivity is optimal in the sense used
in the previous subsection.
Lemma 3. Given the total supply of factors to an industry and in the absence of factor distortions,
the allocation of resources across establishment types generated by the market maximizes aggregate
TFP.
Proof. The allocation that maximizes TFP, given factor inputs to the industry is the allocation that




























































Along with the constraints, these conditions serve to pin down the optimum. But these are
the same equations as the ones that solve for the competitive equilibrium allocation (given factor
supplies) with K = PK=PY etc. This is as before, but for the FOC in N; which after substituting





iPY Yi = PKF:
8 Establishment Data Appendix
8.A Further Details of Dataset
This appendix provides more data on the establishment level data used in the text. The rst
Table reports data from the 1994 National Economic Census of manufacturing establishments. It
estabishes the claim in the text that, although the small (less than 10 employees) establishments
which are excluded from our dataset are numerous, accounting for 84% of the total number of
establishments in the economy, they account for only 22% of total employment.
45Number of plants and employment by size class, 1993
plant size Number of plants Employment
(#N) Numb Cumul Share Cumul Empl Cumul Share Cumul
plants total share total share
1 26,312 26,312 28 28 26,505 26,505 2 2
2-3 27,738 54,049 30 58 67,385 93,889 6 9
4-5 12,480 66,529 13 71 56,050 149,940 5 14
6-10 11,330 77,859 12 84 87,410 237,350 8 22
11-25 8,711 86,570 9 93 141,984 379,334 13 36
26-40 2,418 88,988 3 96 78,236 457,569 7 43
41-50 880 89,868 1 96 40,589 498,159 4 47
51-150 2,348 92,216 3 99 199,975 698,134 19 66
151-250 441 92,657 0 99 87,123 785,256 8 74
251-400 280 92,937 0 100 89,369 874,625 8 82
401+ 219 93,156 0 100 186,903 1,062,528 18 100
Source: 1994 INDEC's National Economic Census (last available economic census)
The data provided to us by INDEC includes an establishment identier which allows us to
track the performance of each establishment over time. The survey provides information on a range
of plant characteristics including the year in which activities began, whether it is the only plant
of the plant, foreign ownership (share of foreign capital equal to 0%, between 0% and 10%, more
than 10%), and subsector (there are 22 subsectors shown in the Table below). The operational data
provided by INDEC includes total wages, total hours worked, cost of inputs, interest payments,
expenditures in electricity, gas and other energy sources, total expenditures, total sales in domestic
and foreign markets (if any) and investment for each establishment. No balance sheet data are
collected, and so we do not have a direct estimate of the plants' capital stock.
8.B Estimation of Employment Levels for Aggregation Purposes
As noted in the text, we use data on the growth rate of employment along with size bin
identiers to estimate the level of employment at each plant at any point in time. The Figure
compares the aggregate series for gross output taken from the INDEC survey, to that constructed
from our data using our estimated employment sizes. As shown in the Figure, the two series move
together quite closely, with the only qualitative dierence occurring in 1998 when the INDEC series
increases, while the estimated series declines slightly.





20 Wood and Cork Products (exc. Furnitures)
21 Pulp and Paper
22 Printing, Editing and Recording Activities
23 Petroleum and Coke (fuel) Products
24 Chemicals Products
25 Rubber and Plastics Products
26 Non-metallic Mineral Products
27 Basic Metals
28 Fabricated Metal Products (exc. Machinery)
29 Mechanical Machinery and Equipment
30 Office Machinery 
31 Electrical Machinery and Components
32 Radio, TV and Communication devices
33 Medical, Optical and Precision Instruments. 
34 Motor Vehicles and Trailers
35 Other tipe of Transportation Vehicles
36 Furnitures
Industries
Figure 6: INDEC Manufacturing Industry Classications
8.C Scatter Plots Illustrating Correlations Between Wedges
Figures 9 through 11 present scatter plots of the log of the wedges against the log of produc-
tivity for the years 1997 and 2002. The gures conrm the patterns described by the statistics in
Table 1 in the text.
8.D Tornqvist vs Fisher Ideal Index
In the text, when examining the growth rate of welfare and output we took derivatives with
respect to time. The formulae that results therefore correspond to growth rates of Divisia Indices.
As our data is measured at discrete intervals, it is necessary to approximate the growth rates of
these Divisia Indices with a discrete index. There are many dierent approximations that may be
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Figure 9: Relationship Between Capital & Productivity Wedges in 1997 & 2002
Using our measure of aggregate intra-industry resource misallocation as an example, we






































Alternatively, we could approximate using a Fisher Ideal Index, constructing
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Figure 10: Relationship Between Intermediate Input & Productivity Wedges in 1997 & 2002




(1 + g1t;t+1)(1 + g2t;t+1)   1:
We also use a Tornqvist index when computing changes in welfare. For the year 2002, this
presents a problem when the contribution of net foreign income changes sign. For that year, we
approximate the log-dierence with a percentage change.
8.E Welfare Analysis Using Data on All Establishments
In the text, we present our welfare analysis using data on surviving establishments. Here we
present the results using data on all rms.
Table : The Change in Welfare and its Components against 1997
All Firms
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Solow Residual  7:45  6:06  3:45  11:45  5:88
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499 Aggregate Data Appendix
9.A Single vs Double Deation
As noted in the text, a potentially serious problem with the measurement of aggregate value
added in Argentina is the widespread use of single deation. To understand the nature of this
error, note that in the theory above, movements in real GDP were constructed from the production
side of the national accounts using equation (15) by taking the growth rate of the value of output,
measured in base year prices, and subtracting from this the value of intermediate input growth, also
valued at base year prices. In the terminology used by national income statisticians, real value
added was constructed using double deation which refers to the fact that prices for both output
and intermediate inputs were held constant. With the addition of energy as an input, this now
requires subtracting growth in energy usage valued at base year prices.
As a practical matter, data on prices are both expensive to collect and subject to serious
measurement error. This problem is especially severe for developing countries. In such cases the
United Nations' System of National Accounts recommends several alternative methods for calculat-
ing real value added15. One of the most commonly used involves deating nominal value added by
the output price and is hence referred to as single deation in which case real value added is given
by
V SD
























In the case of Argentina, the primary measure of real gross domestic product is constructed
from the production side of the accounts, with real value added by industry constructed using dif-
ferent methods for each industry depending on the data available16 We estimate that approximately
one-quarter of Argentine value added is constructed using single deation. To see the size of the po-
tential measurement error this induces, we approximate this complicated state of aairs by treating
gross domestic product data as though it was constructed using single deation for a subcomponent
of the economy denoted SD: In continuous time in the neighborhood of the base year (and hence
ignoring the importance of rebasing), the relationship between Divisia real value added growth,
calculated using double deation (denoted V ), and that measured using a mixture of single and





























where we have exploited the fact that in the base year PV V = PV MV M: This shows that if interme-
diate input prices rise at the same rate as output prices, the two measures are equivalent, while if
they rise faster the growth rate of real value added will be understated. As shown in Figure 11, the
relative price of intermediate inputs to output rose substantially for Argentina during this period.
9.B Balance of Payments Data
As derived above, changes in the ow of net foreign income have a direct eect on the welfare
of the representative consumer in this economy: a decrease in the income paid to foreigners increases
15See paragraphs 16.68 to 16.70 of the United Nations System of National Accounts 1993 available at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/sna1993/toctop.asp.












Figure 11: Relative Prices of Intermediate Inputs
domestic welfare. We use data from the Argentine balance of payments to estimate these changes.
Before doing so, however, we need to confront a number of important measurement issues.
As for most other countries, and as recommended by the International Monetary Fund (2004),
the Argentine balance of payments is constructed on an \accrual basis". On accrual basis, Ar-
gentina's default has no eect on the current account: the payments that were not made as a result
of the default are treated as though they were made, and were funded by an osetting new loan.
As a consequence, it is necessary to modify the measure of net factor income from the balance of
payments for use in calculating welfare changes. We consider two such adjustments.
The rst adjustment we consider is to subtract those payments that were not made as a
result of the default. This can be measured from the size of the osetting loan that appears in the
capital account. We refer to this adjusted net factor income series as being measured on a \cash
basis". However, this measure is also problematic in that it makes no allowance for the expected
reduction in future net foreign income paid abroad as a result of the sovereign default.
The second adjustment is designed to capture this eect, and reects the fact that, by
denition, the current account is intended to capture the change in a country's stock of net foreign
assets. In practice, a country's stock of net foreign assets can change as the result of transactions,
valuation eects reecting exchange rate movements and capital gains and losses, and as the result
of other adjustments such as defaults and nationalizations. The balance of payments, however, was
traditionally designed to capture only those changes due to transactions (see IMF 2004 p.6). It is
this traditional conception of the balance of payments that is used by Argentina.
Argentina does provide estimates of its net international investment position at market prices.
However, these estimates are notoriously dicult to construct given that they involve nding market
prices for many assets that are not traded in liquid markets, and that the identication of assets
that are foreign owned is often dicult. This is particularly problematic in the case of a sovereign
default, where many foreign bonds are held by domestic agents, and many domestic bonds are held
by foreign agents.
51Our second corrected measure of net foreign income uses the reported reduction in liabilities
of the public sector from the International Investment Accounts as an estimate of the eect of the
default on Argentina's net foreign asset position. All three measures are plotted in Figure 12. As
shown, when market values are used, the behavior of net foreign income is both qualitatively and






















Figure 12: Measures of The Current Account Balance
52